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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
\\'I LL! .\.\1 K X :\ YLOR, 'WILLIAM
t·o:-::-;EY .. lA~lES L. XEVILLE and
HL.H: E. IL\ \'SEX,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.

;-: .\ LT L\ KE CITY CORPORATl< 1.\, a municipal corporation. J.
HIL\CK EX LEE, HERBERT F.
"\L\ln', nEORUE B. CATMULL,
l' ti~ HAD HARRISON, JOE L.
l'llHISTEXSE~,

Case No.
10373

RAY ROLFSON,
INC., a

and .\LDEH-WALLACE,
l 'tah <'orporation,

JJd<'ndants and Respondents.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
STA TK\1EXT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an a<'tion for declaratory judgment and in.iunetiw relief challPnging the validity of an ordinance
t'naC'tPd hy Salt Lake City Corporation.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Tlw trial rourt, sitting without a jury, tried the case
on thP merits and entered judgment in favor of the defrndants, dismissing plaintiffs' complaint.

•
•)

RELIEF' SOI'OHT OX .r\P PEAL
Plaintiff~, 'Villiarn Cos~PY and BlaP }' If
.
.
·
~.
ansE>n, ~k
nwersal
of
tlw
Jlld<rllwnt
of
clis1111·
'-'sal
an
I
•
•
•
.-.
•
• • <
c an nrdt>r rli.
rertmg thP trial eourt to PntPr jud<mwnt in fa\·
.
•
• • •
•
l"l
or or th,
plamtif f~, or, that failing-, a new trial.

STA TE~IEXT OF F .AC'T8
On t}w h:t day of Oetolwr, 19fi3, thP Board of Cnru.
~nissionNs of Salt LakP City pa~sPd an ordinanrr rhan~.
mg the zoning <'lassifieation of approxirnatt>ly one-half
of a <·ity hlo<'k from an "H-G'' ( apartnwnt housp) rlassi.
fication to a "B-3" (husinPss) elassifieation. Thi~ suit
was instih1tPd on Odolwr :30, 1963, for judgment deelar.
ing the ordinance invalid and in excess of the City'1
power and authority.
On March 11, 1964, th<' case canw on for pretrial
before the Honorable A. H. Ellett. Upon motion of J,..
frndants' attorneys tlw pretrial judge entered an order
dismissing plaintiffs' complaint (R. 50). The cause n
then appPaled to the Suprt>me Court and this Court's
decision reversed the judgnwnt of dismissal entered~
the district court and directed the latter court to try th!
cause on the nwrits ( 16 Vtah 2d 19:2, 398 P. 2d 27). FW.
lowing the rt>mand to the district court, the case o
pretried by the Honorable .Merrill C. Faux. On the P~
trial order of .Judgf> Faux the rase was tried on Ma.rd
29-31 1965 before the Honorable Stewart M. H&Dill
' without
' a jury. The trial judge entered findilJI
sitting
of fact conclusions of law and a judgment in favorl

'

1: 1 ••

do·!'· 11dant:-:, dirPding- dismissal of thP complaint (R.

l'l:untitT•' <· 1 111t<·ntions an' surnmarizPd in the pre-

11 i:tl ,,,d,·r

t: ...

1

IC :-1::). Th1•:-:1· an•, runong otht:>r things, that

/.•111111~ a"ti1111 i:-: not in tl<'<'ordaneP with a romprehen-

~1\·,. pla11 a:-- n·•p1in·d liy thP provisions of Section

10-9-3,

I _( '. \. I~,.-,:;: that t Ju• anwndnwnt of the zoning map is
,, .1 ~1q1p11rt•·d IJy a showing of changed conditions which
-.1;1r1a1>t tlw a11H·1Hl11wnt, and that no notice of the proi">~• d a111 .. 11<h111•11t of tht> l"st> District ~lap was given as
r"1p1in·d ''>- ~1·1·tio11 10-D-5, CC.A. 1953. Each of these
all1·.::ati1111:- an· dl'ni1•d liy tlw defendants. In the opinion
111' 1.laintiff:-: · <'oun:-:(•I, tlwn· is no material conflict in the
,., 1d1·1w1· 11r \\ ith n•spl'd to n•asonable inferences to be
drawn f'rnm tlw PYidPnee.
( ln or about

SPptPmher 1, 1927, Salt Lake City

111actl'd a ~oning ordinanre> and adopted a Use District
~lnp

111'

''>

in pur:-:nmwl' of a eornprelwnsive plan for the zoning

~alt

Lakl' City. A planning commission was appointed

tlt1· City in ae<"ordance with the provisions of Title 10.
l 'ltapt"r !I, l"tah CodP Annotated 1953. On May 28, 1963,
t 11 1 • d1·ft>rnlant Alder-Wallace filed with the planning

1·0111111i:-::-;ion ib pdition for amendment of the Use Distrit'f ~lap h~- c·hang-ing a part of the city block located

ht'f''''"n !'-it>c·ond and Third South and Sixth and Seventh
I•:a:-:t ~t1n·t~ ( Bloek -I-Ii, Plat "B", Salt Lake City Survey)
l'r11m a H~·sidPntial "R-G" use district to a Commercial
"( '-:l" <·lassifieation. The planning commission reeom1111·ndP<i to the city conunission that the application be
d 1·ni1>d hPeause among other things the proposed change

•
4
was eontrarv
to tlH' <·01111>rPhPnsiv<>
zonin(J'
plan an d would
.
•
•
,
!'.'
eonst1tut1> "spot'' zoning- and that tlH'rP Was n0 nn,...I

·~ot

rt'a~on s}~ow_n. for additional hnsinPss or <'ommnl'la)
zoning- (Exh1b1t P-1, Pgs. 22-23). Tlw citv comm·-·
•
IS!ll\\TI
first nnan imously voted to d<•ny tlw application. Subii~.
<~UPntly a hParing was hPld at the r<>qu<'st of the peti.
honers and the commission reversed its previous d""'
·."'-- 1olOn
and voted unanimously for the change in zoning. Th~
ehange ('ff pctf d hy the zoning aetion rPsnlt<>d in reelas~ 1 •
fication from "R-G'' to a "B-3" use distrirt instf'ad of th"
''C-3" zone sought hy th(' application. The rf'corder did
not publish any notict' prior to th0 }waring informing thP
public that the commission would consider a proposed
change to the "B-3" classification (Exhibit P-1, R.1011.
1

Block 46 and the properties facing it from the four
eompass directions are and have been zoned for resi.
dential use since the enactment of the 1927 zoning ordi.
nance. There are many old structures in the area and
redevelopment and rebuilding have been rapidly takin~
placP with nf'w structur('s built for purposes consistent
with th0 "R-6" zoning classification (Exhibit P-12). In
the opinion of the experts the area involved in the zoning
change was a stable residential area with fine prospect:i
for redevelopment consistent with the existing zonini?
plan (R. 166). The natural effect of the rezoning was to
interrupt this stability and cast considerable doubt nn
the future land use and zoning of all of the abuttint
property (R. 148-149).
There was no evid!:'nce produced either at the hear·
ing or at the trial which would warrant a f mding that

aiiditi1111al <'<11111111•r<'ial or business zoning was needed.
r 1, 1h" 11•·n r Yi<'init:• of Block 46 there are 4111:! acres of
r:u:-:in•·:-:"' ·· H-T· zoning-, :27/'c of which is not used for busi- - I.:.: a<'l'l'S o f "C,. 1" zoning,
.
40ct.
f h'
:""'·"' p11rpo:-1·:-;: .>.>
1 o o w 1ch

11:-:1·d for hn:-;irn·ss purpo~ws; and 243.3 acres of "C:i · · zn11i11g-. :l'.! 1 .~ '7~ of which is not used for business pur1•

nr>t

l·:\hihit P-1. P~s. 22-23; Exhibit P-13). In the
('it~ as a who!" fiO:~.-t acres are zoned "B-3" and only
1~,-...-+ a<'n·:-; an· us"d for husiness or commercial purposes
I E\liihit P-7. Pg-. :t!).
l"'='":-:

1

Tlt1· fa<'t that tlwre 1s ample available commercial

11r l111si1wss propPrty in the near vicinity of Block 46
s1·1·111:-: to han h1•1•n <'!early recognized by the commission .
.\layor L1·1·, <·hair111an of the commission, testified on
<·r11ss-1·xai11ination as follows: (R. 311)

''Q. One of thP grounds stated in here [the plan-

ning commission report] one of the grounds
for dPnial, 'there is already considerable land
in the general area already zoned for business or c>ommercial, which is not so used.'
Kow was there any evidence at the hearing
that indicated that this statement was not
correctf
A. \Veil, I think that at least I knew and usumed the other commissioners knew, that
tlwre was other ground available.

Q. That there was other ground available!
A. YPs.

Q. And that the other ground that was avail-

able was already zoned for commercial or
business?
A. Yes.

6

Q.
A.

You knew that at the time?
Oh, yes."

ConnnissionPr Harrison, also a ddPn~c·
· witnPss, tPsti.
fi ed : ( R. 3+8)

HQ. Commissioner Harrison were vou a
h f
'
·
.
ware of

A.
Q.

A.

t P ~ct ~h~t thPre. was considerable land in
the
city
hrmts and
m the vicinity of th·
.
h
.
is zonmg_ c ange which _was zoned commerciallv
which was not bemg used for conunerci~J
purposes1
I was, yes.

And do you know, do you know whether or
not that land was available for commercial
use1
I am sure much of it was, yes."

In the mind of Commissioner Harrison the principal
reasons for changing the zone classification from resi.
dential to commercial was that privatP capital \Yas willing to expend money for a comnwrcial devp]opment that
would "clean up" an old residential area and that thw
would be additional tax rt>venue (R. 350). Mayor Lee
was motivated by the fact that new business would come
into the area and place a new commercial development
in the stead of a run-down residPntial area; that no
buffer on Seventh East could be maintained in any event,
and that "we have an obligation to these people who
own property [in Block 46]" (R. 318).
It does not appear from the Pvidence that the zoning
action was made \vi th reference to any comprehensive
or general plan. The planning commission reported that
busines..; zoning in Block 46 would be contrary to the

7
c<>ll!Jli"i

l11·11~iw plan ( Exhihit P-1, Pgs. 22-23). The zon-

ii::..:· ;id inn ''a~ in<'on~ist<·nt with thP zoning map in effect
,111 tli·· ,;at•· of ilit> appli<'ation (Exhibit P-5) in that it
,. ···:tt1·d a II"\\. <·0111111<·r<'ial district in the center of a
r··,.1d( 11t ial dist :·id and y<'t within walking distance of
,,\;,i 111'.~ <·01111n1•r<'ial districts.
Further, the City had
1 ·1·\·i,111,.J: <'rt•at<·d a llf'\\' Residential District (R-7) in11
• 11 d1·d tn lH· a hnf'frr lwtween commercial or business
Jll'"l"'rt:· in th<· downtown ar<>a to the WPSt and residential 11rr1111•:·t~· to tlw Past (R. 126-128). This new "buffer"
zon1· \\·n" )o('at<'d in tht> hlock west of Block 46 and the
<'i'frd of tlw zoning aetion was to create business districts
on !10th si<l<·s of the buffer.
At tlw time of application for rezoning the City had
in pffpd a ('nrrent general land use plan (Exhibit P-10).
Thi' g1·n('!'a] plan did not contemplate a new commercial
district in Bloek -1-G. Tht> zoning action here in crea:ting
an 1·ntir•·l:· Ill'\\' business district (as opposed to enlargenwnt ol' an Pxisting business district) is without preced1•nt in C'ity history exeept in one or two instances where
!If'\\' r('si<h,ntial <l<'YPlopnwnt has required a regional
shopping <'<'nter ( R. 18-1-). At least six prior applications
for lmsirn·ss or eornmercial zoning in the immediate area
had lwPn dPnied by th<> eity commission before Block 46
was rPzoned ( R 272-275).
WhPn aslwd about the reference which the zoning
aetion had to any general or comprehensive plan, Mayor
L<>e said: (R. 31+)

"I don't think anyone can hold to a plan in the
h11ilding of a city."

8

Speaking- of thP attitndP of the citv planning
· .
cornnuss1on
·
·
n·g-ardmg propost>d "B-3" zoning in the immedi t
a e area
o f B lock -1-6, Mayor Lee said: (R-315)
"The zoni~g commission turned it down. Ma
they are rzght, but I just don't think you can (blde
to a plan."
o

The Salt Lake City planning director, the assistant
C~t~~ planning director, the Salt Lake County zoning ad.
1111mstrator, and the former County planning director
Pach testified that in their opinions the zoning action
was contrary to comprehensive planning and in manv
specific respects in violation of reeognized plannin~
criteria and acknowledged City policy.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE ZONING ACTION IS INVALID BECAUSE IT IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE W1TH
A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN AS REQU1RED
BY THE ENABLING STATUTE.
Salt Lake City is empowered by statute to "regulate
and restrict ... the location and use of buildings, struc·
tures and land for trade, industry, residence or other
purposes" and for that purpose to "divide the municipali·
ty into districts of such number, shape and area as may
be deemed best suited to carry out the purposes of [the
statute]" (10-9-1, 2, U.C.A., 1953). The power of the
City to enact zoning ordinances in accordance wi~ _the
intent and purpose of the statute and within the liwta·
tions of the statute is not questioned in this case.

9

Tlw City, ho,,·ever, does not have the unlimited, undefined and unrestricted power to legislate the use of
propert:·. Statutory limitations are specifically imposed
b:· Section 10-9-~1, U.C.A., 1953:
''10-9-8. Regulations to be in accordance
with comprPhensive plan.-Such regulations shall
111' madP in accordance with a comprehensive p"la!n
designed to lessen congestion in the streets to
'
secure safety from fire, panic and other dangers,
to promote health and the general welfare, to provide adequate light and air, to prevent the overcrowding of land, to avoid undue concentration
of population, to facilitate adequate provision for
transportation, water, sewage, schools, parks and
other public requirements. Such regulations shall
be made 'with rmsonable consideration, among
othPr things, to the character of the district and
its peculiar suitability for particular uses, and
u·ith a view to conserving the value of buildings
and encouraging the most appropriate use of "land
throughout the city." (Emphasis added)
-

ThP decision of this Court in Marshall v. Salt Lake
City, 105 Ftah 111, 141 P.2d 704, fixes some guidelines
and standards hy which the validity of municipal zoning
action is to hf' determined. There the purpose and limitations of the zoning authority were expressed as follows:
(105 etah 111, 119-125)

" ... As shown by the above quotes from the
statute, the city is authorized to regulate and restrict 'the location and use of buildings, structures and land for trade, industry, residence and
other purposes' and to accomplish this 'may divide the municipality into Districts of such number, shape and area as may be deemed best suited
to carry out the purposes of this Article.' (Italics

10

ours) This is done• lmd0r tlw police power and b
th<> statutP must bP done• in acconlance with y
comprehmsiv<> plan, desig110d, intPr alia to le a
.
.
'
ssen
congPsho_n_ m thP str<>Pt, promotP the general WP].
farP,_ fae1htatP transportation, and other public
n•qu_1n•rnr>~ts. It shall be done ,,-ith reasonable
co~s1d::at10n of th_P eharact<>r of thP (fo:triet. it~
smtab1hty for particular uses 'and with a view to
.
* * * an d encouragmg
.
tlle most appro.
(•onsPrvmg
priate use of land.' Section 15-8-91, supra. That
thP statute contemplates a division and regulation
hy districts, instead of n•gnlation hy singlP lnt<
or small groups of lots, is evidPnt. The rrgu!a.
ti on of the USP of propPrty h:- lots or hy very small
areas is not zoning and do0s violence to the purpose and provisions of the statute. It would not,
and could not, accomplish the purpose of the law
as sPt forth in the statute quoted supra....
"City zoning is authorized only as an exerrise
of thP policP power of the state. It must therefore have for its purposes and objectives matters
which come within the province of the policP
power. "When exercised hy a city, it is of nerP~~itY
confined by the limitations fixed in the grant by
the state, and to accomplishment of the purposes
for which the state authorized the city to zone.
Those purposes, which control and must he ~uh
served hy any zoning, are set forth in Section 158-91, U.C.A., 1943, quoted supra. The elements
required of a zoning plan are: It must be comprehensive; it must be desig11ed to protect the health,
safetv and moi'als of the inhabitants; to promote
the g~~eral welfare; avoid overcro~ding an? _c~m
gestion in traffic and populahon; fac1htate
transportation and other public service; and meet
the ordinary or common requirements of hap~y,
convenient and romfortable living by the inhabitants of the districts, and thP rity as a whole.···

•••
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''Tlw hasic purpose of zoning is to 'bring
aliont an onforly d(~velopment of cities, to establi~h <fr.;trids into which husin<>ss, commerce, and
irnlnstr>· sliall not intrude, and to fix certain territor:· for differ<"nt grades of industrial concerns.
"' * " Tlw exPrcise [of this power] must have a
'.'nl>stantial relation to the public good within the
splwn•s hPld proper.' "White's Appeal, 287 Pa.
:!.YI, 1:1..J- A. -t-09, 412, 53 A.L.R. 1215. 'It is a
fundau1ental theory of the zoning scheme that it
shall lw for the general good, to secure reasonable
n<'ighhorhood uniformity, and to exclude structur0s and occupations which clash therewith.'
''Zoning is don<~ for the benefit of the city as
a wholP, and the limitations imposed on respeetiv<> districts must be done with a view to the
hr>nPfit of the district as a whole, and not from
eomidt'ratiou of particular tracts .... • • •
" 'Tlu• tests of validity in such cases are:
Does the ordinance bear a reasonable relation to
the puhlic h0alth, morals, safety or general welfarP: have tlw districts been created according to
a fair and rational plan?' "
TJin n•quir<'~lIPnt that municipal zoning be "in accordance
with a c·ornprdwnsive plan" is similar to legislative en-

aetrnmts of morP than forty states.

ThP Illf•aning of the term "comprehensive plan" is
clisrussed in appellants' brief in case No. 10114 at pages
1S th rough 25. In brief, the comprehensive standard
rPquir"s that the zoning ordinance or any amendments
th<>rdo lw logically n•latc>d to considerations broader
than th0 property imnwdiately affected and that it fit
into somP g<•neral or over-all scheme or plan for the
developrnPnt of the Citv as a whole.

12
Salt Lake City adopted a zoning map with the enact.
ment of the 1927 ordinance (Exhibit P-2). This map
contemplated that gt>neral business and commercial land
use would not Pxtend Past bPyond Fifth East Street and
that Block 4G would be ust>d for residential purposes.
The land was actually developed on the basis of this plan
and new development in the area of Block 46 has been
consistent with this plan. The City, by its planning com.
mission, conducted a further study in 1943 and published
its plan for desirable land use, which plan also contem.
plated that the general business and commercial district
of the City would not <;>xtend east beyond Fifth East
Street and that Block -±6 and the immediate area would
be reserved for residential use (Exhibits P-8, P-9). The
general plan for land use in effect at the time of the
zoning change also directed that Block 46 and the immediate area adjacent thereto continue in its established
use (Exhibit P-10).
The city commission was advised by their planning
commission that the proposed zoning change in Block 46
was contrary to the comprehensive plan (Exhibit P-1.
Pgs. 22-23). The significant feature of this case, hoicever, is not the departure from the general plan but the
fact that the change was not made with reference to any
genera-l or over-all purpose or objective in the diviswn
and regulation of land in the city by districts. The reason for the zoning action is apparent from the evidenCR
offered by defendants and particularly from the testimony of Mayor Lee and Commissioner Harrison. De·
f endant Alder-"\\r all ace selected a site for a commercial
development (which happened to be in an area zoned and

13
residential purposes) and represented to the city
that if tlw cit!· would rezone that portion of the block
,rhi<'h it had sPlected for commercial use, the developer
,, nnld rPrnove the deteriorated structures in the rezoned
ar•'rt aJ](l construet commercial buildings. Defendant
.\Ider-\Vallace told the commission and the court that
tlw landowners in the area selected would receive more
rnorn•y for their land than they could hope to get for residl'ntial purposes and that the city would in turn derive
mon, n•venue from Block 46 in terms of sales and propPrty taxes. The reason for the selection of residential
property rather than expensive nearby commercial
property is obvious. Zoning action based solely upon
~ueh considerations is invalid beeause it does not take
into account the requirements that the ordinance "secure
reasonable neighborhood uniformity," "bring about an
ordrrly development of cities ... establish districts into
which business ... shall not intrude ... ," and "divide the
municipality into Districts of such number, shape and
area as may be deemed best suited to carry out the purpose [of the statute]" (Marshall, supra).
n~Prl for

By ignoring its comprehensive plan in this instance
the City hopes for economic gain in the improvement of
an old residential area and increased taxes from Block
-!6. The short-sighted nature of this sort of thinking is
pointed up in the City's own study of 1943 (Exhibit P-8,
Pg. 26).
". . . changes to lower forms of land use
should be very thoughtfully studied as to necessity and location. Furthermore, it is especially
easy for a ... commercial area to blight or reduce

14
tlw econo~ni~ us<>fulne_ss o~ an adjarPnt rrsidential
arPa. This 1s happPnmg m thousands of cas ·
Salt Lake Cit\'
an annual ur<>nes
Ill
: tod:w•. with
.
,- - onur
loss probably m the n!1lhons. l_Tnless, as is seldom
th~' ras'.'- the s1wculahve value for business ... of
this. hl1ghtt,d lan~l ean lw <'apitaliJwd upon im.
nwd~ately, both city and the owner lose. One of
tlH' important rPsults of planning is stability in
land USP, and onP of tlw most drai11atie manif~sta.
tions of poor planning or lack of planning in am
eity is unstable property valut>s which are a ha~.
hinger of the more serious forms of blight."
Then' is no 1m•rPdent for tltP aetion of the City in
this caS(' (TI. 18-1). Tlw change of zoning interrupted a
stable District crPatPd 3G years before and cast grrat
doubt and speeulation on land use in the entire area.
\\l1ile this result is lwing brought about, the Chairman
of the Board of ConnnissionPrs is saying, "I don't think
anyone• can hold to a plan in the building of a city" (R.
31-1).
A similar situation was prt>senh•d in the case of
Kuehne c. Town of East I!artford, 13G Conn. 452. 7~
A.2d -17-1. The facts are similar to those involved in the
case at bar. The zoning authority of the Town of Ea8t
Hartford rezoned propPrty in a residential zone for
business usP. Tlw applicant intPnded to erect facilitie1
for six or eight stores in the nature of retail stores and
small business establishments calculated to serve the
nt>eds of residents in tlw vicinity. A small area already
zoned for business was located relatively close. Fifty-one
of the residents of the area filed their petition in support
of the change. An appeal from the zoning action was
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tal;"n to th(• ( ~onn<'dicnt trial court where the action of
rlw zoning anthorit~· was affirmed. On appeal the Coniw!'til'nt S11pn·111<' Court rewrsed, holding: (72 A.2d
+7 -L .+ 7,-.., .+ l!l J
":\ lilllitation upon the powers of zoning
antlwriti(•s ... is that tlw regulations they adopt
lllll"t IH' ma<lP 'in accordance with a comprehensiY<' plan.' ...
"l n t IH' cas(' h<>fore us it is obvious that the
"01m('i] lookPd no further than the benefit which
mig·ht acenw to Langlois and those who resided
in tlw Yicinity of his property, and that they gave
no <·onsi<leration to the larger question as to the
pffrd th<> change would have upon the general
plan of zoning in the community."

"The action of the town council in this case
was not in furtherance of any general plan of
zoning in the community and cannot be sustained."
A p1wllants r<>s1wctfully submit that the zoning action

in this <·as<> is not in furtherance of any general or compreh<•nsin zoning plan and that it cannot be sustained.
POINT II.
Tl!E ZOXIXG ACTION IS INVALID BECA l'SI·~ THERE HAS BEEN NO CHANGE
OF COXDITTOXS -WHICH WOULD WARRANT OR .JrSTIFY THE AMENDMENT OF
THE ZOXING MAP.
Bloek -f(i and lands surrounding it have been zoned
for rPsidPntial us<> since enactment of the 1927 ordinance.
The action in th<> instant case constitutes the creation of
an Pntirel~· new business district. The new business dis-
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triet is a suhstantial departure from the existing map or
plan in that it is an independent district of some consequene(' and size loeated in tlw center of a residential area
and yt>t in close proximity to tlw existing commercial
and business an'a of the City.
Presumably, the plan existing at the time of the
amendment (which classified the property as residential)
was a fair, rational and comprehensive plan. This presumption is recognized in the case law. See e.g. Northwest Merchants Terminal Inc. r. O'Rourke, 191 Md. i21,
60 A.2d 7-13, where the court said:
"There is a presumption that zones are well
planned and arranged and are to be more or less
permanent sub;ject to change only to meet genuine
change in conditions." (Emphasis added)
One of the formal requirements underlying the
validity of any change in the zoning ordinance is that
there must be a corresponding change of eonditions justifying the zoning amendment. In Page i:. City of Portland, 178 Ore. 632, 165 P.2d 280, the Oregon Supreme
Court, in striking down an amendatory ordinance, said:
"Police power must be exercised to promote
the general welfare of the people at large, and
not for the interests of any private group [citing
authorities]. Amendments to zoning ordinances
should be made with cauti.on and only when changing conditions clearly require am~ndme1!t. Otherwise, the very purpose of zoning will be destroyed." (Emphasis added)
To the same effect is Wilcox, et al. v. City of Pittsburgh.
121F.2d835 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1941), where the trial court had
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on motion a eomplaint attacking an amendatory onlinane<•. Tlw dismissal order was reversed by the
('ll'l'llit <·ourt in an opinion which read in part as follows:

disw1~sed

"In the juristic sense we think the council
have heen fully put upon their proof. The general
principlP is eoneeded. Changes in the plan, like
tlw enactm<:>nt of the original ordinance, are an
pxereise of police power. . . . As conditions are
fh,, 11(/sis and justification for zoning, clearly a
1·hange in the former is essential to a change in
the latter." (Emphasis added)
TIH· genPral rule requiring "change of conditions" as a
lmsis for anwndment of a zoning ordinance is stated in
101 C..J.S. 837 and the cases are collected in footnotes in
the same volume and in the pocket parts.

In a period of 36 years there will be some change of
eon<litions, but the "change of conditions" referred to in
tht> cases refers to facts or circumstances existing at the
ri11H"' of the change which did not exist at the time of the
orig-inal ordinance and which renders the property more
suitable for a new or different use. Block 46 and the
surrounding property were used for residential purposes
at the time of the amendment and redevelopment with
new structures was rapidly taking place consistent with
thr residential zone. There is adequate property in the
near vicinity already zoned for business or commercial
purposes. Both of the commissioners who testified recognizPd this fact (R. 311, 348). The undisputed evidence
~hows that Block -1-6 was stable and redeveloping consistent with the existing zone classification; that there
is existing commercial within close proximity which is
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availahlP for commercial use, much of which is in need
of redevelopnwnt for conunt>rcial or business purposes
and that the City already has far more commercial zon~
ing than its nPt>ds rt>quire. There is no justification
whatever for tlw interruption of 3G years' stabilitv in
Block 46. There being no "change of conditions" ~uch
as to warrant tht> amendment, the zoning action is invalid.

POINT III.
THE ZO~ING ACTIO~ IS INYALID BECAPSE NOTICE OF THE PPBLIC HEARING WAS NOT PUBLISHED AS REQUIRED
BYLAW.
The zoning power of the City is limited by the statutory grant of authority of the legislature. The legislature
has specifically required that "all proposed amendments
be first submitted to the planning commission for its
recommendation" and that there be "15 days' notice and
public hearing" in connection with any such amendment
( 10-9-5, lr.c.A., 1953). The language of the statute is
mandatory and not permissive. In the case at bar the
petitioner did not submit any proposal for "B-3" zoning
to the planning commission. The planning director did
testify that ''B-3" zoning would also have had an unfavorable recommendation from the planning commission
( R. 160, 161). The purported notice of the public hearing
informed the general public of a proposed change from
"R-6" to "C-3" (Exhibit P-1, Pg. 8). Never at any time
was there any publication of notice prior to the hearing
indicating that the city commission would consider an
amendment to "B-3" zoning for Block 46. It is thus
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apparPnt that the literal requirements of the enabling
;;tatute were ignored in this instance. It is respectfully
~nbmitte<l that this furnishes another reason why the
action of the zoning authority may not be upheld.

CONCLUSION
The zoning authority has not acted in the furtherance of any general or comprehensive plan for zoning in
the City. The amendment of the ordinance is in direct
violation of the existing plan for orderly development of
thP City as a whole. There is no change of conditions
which v..arrants the interruption of the area where the
zone change was made, and no notice was given to the
public with respect to the proposal for creation of a new
•'B-3" district. The judgment of the trial court should
be reversed with directions to enter a decree declaring
the amendatory ordinance void.
Respectfully submitted,
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